Free West Virginia Property practice questions

Answer: A. It is prohibited, because an agent may not knowingly place coverage with an insolvent insurer.

West Virginia law bars an agent, and equally an excess line broker, from knowingly placing any coverage with an insolvent insurer. The agent here knew of the insolvency, so the placement is prohibited. The provision contains no exception for a client's written acknowledgment, so a signed form does not make the placement permissible. The restriction names agents and excess line brokers together, so reading it as reaching brokers only is wrong. The rule is stated in terms of the insurer's insolvency and the agent's knowledge, and it says nothing about the status of the insurer's license, so an unrevoked license does not make the placement lawful.

Answer: B. Severally only, with each defendant answering for the share that matches its percentage of fault

Sec. 55-7-13c(a) makes each defendant's liability for compensatory damages several only, never joint, and each defendant is liable only for the damages allocated in direct proportion to its percentage of fault, with a separate judgment against each. The same subsection permits joint liability for defendants who consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan to commit a tortious act or omission, and subsection (h) lists further conduct that triggers joint and several liability. No part of the section makes joint liability depend on a defendant's fault exceeding 50 percent.

Answer: A. Disapprove it, because a misleading title is a ground for disapproval

The Commissioner shall disapprove a form that has any title, heading or other indication of its provisions that is misleading. Calling fire-and-lightning-only coverage "All Risk" misstates what the form provides, so the title alone requires disapproval. Clear wording inside the form does not cure a misleading title, the section provides no attach-a-disclosure alternative, and it does not wait for a consumer complaint.

Answer: A. It is unreasonable, because a lender's standards may not call for disapproving a policy that contains more coverage than required.

Sec. 33-11-5(b)(2) treats a lender's disapproval as unreasonable unless it rests solely on reasonable, uniformly applied standards tied to the extent of coverage required and the insurer's financial soundness and services. It adds that those standards may not call for rejecting a policy because it contains coverage in addition to what is required. Applying the rule to every borrower does not save it, because uniformity cannot rescue a standard the subsection forbids, and the subsection does not make written reasons the test.

Answer: D. A subsisting West Virginia license authorizing casualty insurance in this state

W. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 33-3-1(d) bars a domestic insurer, and a foreign insurer working from offices, personnel or facilities in West Virginia, from soliciting applications or otherwise doing insurance business in another state or country unless it holds a current, subsisting license from the Commissioner authorizing the same kind or kinds of insurance in West Virginia. Because this insurer is licensed here only for property, it needs West Virginia authority for casualty before its staff solicit casualty business in Ohio. An Ohio license or the Ohio regulator's consent does not meet that West Virginia condition, and the subsection does not make the requirement depend on whether the insurer also writes casualty in West Virginia.

Answer: C. A violation, because knowingly omitting a true entry of a material fact is itself prohibited

Sec. 33-11-4(5)(b) bars two things: knowingly making a false entry of a material fact in a book, report or statement, and knowingly failing to make a true entry of a material fact about a person's business in that person's records. Deliberately leaving out a material payment is the second of these, so accurate entries elsewhere do not cure it. The paragraph is about the books themselves and says nothing about filing them with the commissioner. The general business practice standard appears in the claim settlement list of subdivision (9), not in subdivision (5).

Answer: D. It is defective, because the percentages for the incident must total zero or 100 percent

Sec. 55-7-13a(c) requires that the comparative fault percentages the trier of fact assigns for a particular incident or injury total either zero percent or one hundred percent. Here the shares add to 90 percent, so the allocation fails that requirement, and the statute gives no option to leave part of the fault unassigned. Nothing in the provision caps any one person's share at half. Subsection (b) of the same section applies comparative fault to property damage actions as well as injury and death claims, and it includes plaintiffs among the persons to whom fault is allocated.

Answer: D. The Insurance Commissioner, using the commissioner's seal

W. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 33-2-3(a) lists among the commissioner's duties affixing the commissioner's official seal to documents that domestic insurers are required to file in other states. The section gives this task to the commissioner and assigns it to no other officer, so neither the Secretary of State nor the insurer's own corporate officer is the right answer. The Attorney General is wrong because subsection (b) of the same section mentions the Attorney General only as a source of legal assistance and representation the commissioner may call upon, which is a different role from sealing filings.

Answer: C. As the agent of the insurer that issued the policy, and not as the agent of the insured.

W. Va. Code Ann. Sec. 33-12-22 provides that anyone who solicits an application for insurance in this state is regarded, in a controversy between the insured or beneficiary and the insurer that issued the policy on that application, as the insurer's agent and not the insured's. The customer's signature on the application does not shift that treatment to the insured. The section applies to any person who solicits, so it does not turn on whether the solicitor holds an appointment, and it does not make the answer depend on who paid the solicitor.

Answer: C. It is not refunded, because the statute bars a refund of it

Sec. 33-12-17(a) lets the commissioner fix expiration dates for individual producer and solicitor licenses in whatever manner spreads the office workload efficiently. Where a newly fixed date would, on its first occurrence, cut short the period already paid for, the statute directs that no refund of unearned fee be made. A pro rata refund is therefore wrong, and the subsection provides neither a credit toward renewal nor an election between refund and credit. The mirror case is also addressed: where the new date lengthens the paid period, the commissioner charges no additional fee.